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The Perfect Crime
There I see a miserable people groaning under an
iron yoke, the human race crushed in a grip of
oppressors, and an enraged mob overwhelmed by
pain and hunger whose blood and tears rich men
drink in peace. And everywhere the strong are
armed against the weak with the formidable power
of law.
Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Principles of the Rights
of War 1
The occupation does not occupy only territory; it
also occupies people and daily life. It occupies the
past, present, and future. It distorts history, alters
names, and oppresses the language of the
occupied people. With one stroke, the West Bank
becomes Judea and Samaria, Nablus becomes
Schem, al-Khalil turns into Hebron, and the
Occupied Territories become the Area, the
administered Territories or the Territories.
Language becomes a mechanism to disguise and
conceal the reality, a mechanism to present an
alternative reality by giving it new packaging.2 The
Supreme Court cooperates with these processes
and helps rewrite the history of the Occupied
Territories. In creating judicial principles that have
in the passage of time become judicial heritage,
the Court has assimilated the perspective of the
occupier and rejected that of the victim.
“It is in the nature of a victim” writes Jean-
Francois Lyotard, “not to be able to prove that one
has been done a wrong. A plaintiff is someone
who has incurred damages and who disposes of
the means to prove it. One becomes a victim if
one loses these means. One loses them, for
example, if the author of the damages turns out
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directly or indirectly to be one’s judge. The latter
has the authority to reject one’s testimony as false
or the ability to impede its publication…. the
‘perfect crime’ does not consist in killing the victim
or the witnesses… but rather in obtaining the
silence of the witnesses, the deafness of the judges,
and the inconsistency (insanity) of the testimony.”3
[emphasis added - N.S.]
Following Lyotard, this article examines the
rhetorical means that the Supreme Court uses to
erase the Palestinian narrative by rejecting it as
false and trampling on its remains. The article
focuses on Supreme Court decisions concerning
petitions filed on behalf of Palestinians in the
Occupied Territories during the Intifada that
erupted in late September 2000. In particular, it
explores the legal discourse underlying these
decisions, and the enormous gulf between two
conflicting narratives. In the Jewish Israeli
narrative, the Intifada is perceived as violence and
terror that threatens the daily existence and
personal security of Israelis. In the Arab
Palestinian narrative, the Intifada is perceived in
terms of freedom, national liberation,
independence, self-determination, and struggle
against occupation.
Supreme Court decisions delivered during the
Intifada show that the Israeli judicial discourse
does not register the Palestinian narrative, and the
cries of pain and the desire for freedom that
characterize it. The justices do not understand the
Palestinian suffering, which is viewed as false and
its representation in the legal language entails
violence. As May Jayyusi writes: “The
representation of the ‘other’ between two unequal
discourses involves a violence in that, as Talal
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Asad points out, weaker languages are more likely
to submit to forcible transformation in the
process... The violence done to the ‘other’ lies in
that this other has to present itself within the terms
of the dominant discourse.”4 In cases brought by
Palestinians, the Supreme Court employs legal
techniques that Avigdor Feldman categorizes as
cunning:
Repression, justification, avoidance, and
forgetfulness… In the Territories, the Supreme
Court adjudicates people whose life experiences do
not touch it, whose language is foreign to it, whose
culture is estranged to its culture. No channel of
communication exists between it and them.5
The  Sup reme  Cou r t
With the outbreak of the Intifada, the effect and
severity of human rights violations against
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories increased,
thereby presenting the Supreme Court with great
challenges. The Supreme Court did not meet these
challenges and failed to act and protect human
rights in the Occupied Territories. Rather, it chose
to serve as a rubber stamp for questionable
security considerations, employing judicial
violence and oppression. The Court readily
expressed its desire not to interfere with the
military and “security” considerations, an old fig
leaf used to cover up grave harm to Palestinians.
Palestinians who turned to the Supreme Court
returned empty handed, their petitions rejected.
As far back as 1986, Avishai Ehrlich found that
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories had no
chance to succeed in their petitions to the
Supreme Court. Of 59 petitions filed in the second
half of 1986, none of the Palestinians emerged
victorious. Ehrlich further found that 87.7% of the
petitions dealt with the military’s use of physical
force, such as demolition and the sealing of
houses, expropriation of property and land,
deportation, denial of freedom of movement,
restrictions on entry and exit from the country,
and the prevention of family unification.6
Ronen Shamir found that of 557 petitions filed
from 1967 to 1986 by Palestinians in the Occupied
Territories, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
petitioners and rejected the position of the Israeli
authorities in only five instances, representing less
than 1% of the cases. Only 65 petitions reached
the litigation stage. Shamir noted that Palestinian
victories were only symbolic; in those cases, too,
the Supreme Court’s decisions reinforced the
legitimacy of Israel’s occupation policy.7 Supreme
Court decisions from the end of September 2000
to early September 2001, some of which are
discussed below, provide comparable results to
those found by Ehrlich and Shamir.
The argument over whether to seek redress in
the Supreme Court and the utility (or lack of
utility) of petitioning the Court is not new.8 Some
Palestinians contend that applying to the Supreme
Court symbolizes recognition of the occupying
state and legitimizes the oppressive military
regime, without offering fair consideration. In
addition, it should be emphasized that the
acceptance of the rules of the game itself
necessarily results in comparable use of these
rules and of the language in which the legal
proceedings are held, e.g., the language in which
the rules of the game are written. These rules are
rigid and changing them is complex. The attempt
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“to take part and yet feel not a part,” that is, to
petition the Court without yielding to the dictated
rules is ineffective and does not lead to success of
any kind, as I demonstrate in the discussion of the
cases below.
Palestinians are allowed to petition the
Supreme Court as a matter of goodwill and not of
right. Some argue that this practice expresses the
liberal nature of the occupation. Ehrlich rejects
this contention and argues that the purpose of
allowing Palestinians to petition the Israeli
Supreme Court was to challenge the status of the
Arab Supreme Court of Appeals that operated in
Ramallah, and to give a liberal image to the
occupation, which masks its oppressive reality.9
Leon Sheleff argues that judgments in favor of the
authorities are built into the arrangement:
Conditioning the litigation on the consent of the
authorities-respondents tied the hands of the Court,
because a large number of decisions in favor of the
petitioners was liable to raise doubts about the
continued consent of the respondents.10
According to Sheleff, this explains the judicial
passivity so evident in decisions relating to the
Occupied Territories, a passivity that is reflected in
the readiness of the Court to accept the authorities’
arguments dealing with security considerations.11
The  Rhe to r i ca l  and
Na r ra t i ve  Too l s  o f  t he
P r o f e s s i o n
A conspicuous characteristic of the vast majority of
the judgments dealing with the Occupied
Territories during al-Aqsa Intifada is that they are
brief, most of them containing only a few lines.
The Court is not interested in the details of the
oppression as stated in the petitions, and it rushes
to rule in favor of the Israeli authorities. The Court
does not seriously address petitions filed by
Palestinians. It acts with a lack of trust, is closed-
minded, and shows utter disregard to the
petitioners’ arguments and the suffering that they
wish to portray to the Court. It should be noted
that in most cases the Supreme Court delivers its
decisions without holding a hearing or after only
one hearing is conducted.
Another evident symptom is the collective
decision-making and yet, the anonymous issuance
of decisions. One justice does not deliver the
decision in his or her name in which other justices
join or dissent; the decisions are signed by the
whole panel hearing the case. This anonymity
indicates the uniform and consensual approach of
Israeli Supreme Court justices. This unanimity may
be explained by the fact that the justices belong to
the Israeli consensus on the Question of Palestine,
and play an important role in shaping that
consensus. All justices of the Supreme Court are
Jews and most served in the State Attorney’s
Office. The Internet logo of Israel’s judiciary opens
with “Zion shall be redeemed with judgment, and
those that return unto her with righteousness.”
(Isaiah 1: 27). That is, the law is perceived as a tool
to attain the collective Jewish goal, and hence, the
religious quotation.
Another element that assists the Court in
ignoring Palestinian reality is the frequent use of
the phrase “we are satisfied,” also stated, as noted,
in the plural.12 The Supreme Court considers itself
part of the “struggle of the people of Israel.” It
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allows the authorities to do the “important work”
without obstacle. At times, the Court “forgets
itself ” (or perhaps reminds those who forgot) and
adopts without deliberation the opinion of the
state authorities. In doing this, the Supreme Court
turns the state’s security interests into lofty and
natural interests that are not open to criticism. For
example, in S’adi ‘Abd Al-‘Ashi,13 in which the
petitioners contested the decision of the General
Security Service to prohibit a detainee from
meeting his attorney, Justice Heshin-Engelard-
Levy ruled that:
In the application of Petitioner’s counsel, we read,
in camera and without him being present, written
material submitted to us in the matter of the
Petitioner, and we were persuaded that the lofty
interests of state security demand that it not be
divulged to Petitioner’s counsel.14 [emphasis
added - N.S.]
In Dir Astiyeh Local Council,15 the petitioners
objected to the army’s expropriation of land. The
army contended that the land was necessary for a
military purpose, namely, the paving of a road for
the movement of army vehicles. Justice Barak-
Dorner-Beinisch presented the case in the first line
of the judgment, as follows: “The Petitioners’ land
was seized to meet military needs.” This statement
sealed the fate of the petition. After summarizing
the petitioners’ claims in two lines, the panel
stated:
We are unable to accept these claims. In the past,
stones were thrown at vehicles on the existing
road… We have no basis not to accept the
Respondent’s position on the motive for taking this
measure, and on its contribution to the security of
the area. It is not collective punishment. We did not
find anything unreasonable in the action that was
taken. For these reasons, the petition is rejected.
[emphasis added - N.S.]
Physicians for Human Rights16 dealt with the
legality of the army’s policy of establishing
checkpoints. The judgment opens with a
statement of the facts and its first few lines dictate
the result:
The checkpoints exist and have existed for several
months, following the grave security situation in
these areas, as part of the army’s effort to prevent
terrorist attacks, which take a heavy toll on human
life in the Territories themselves and within Israel.
The Petitioner contends that these checkpoints,
which create a closure or constitute a siege cause
the local population to suffer… [emphasis
added - N.S.]
The Supreme Court presents the army’s
contentions as concrete facts. The contention
about Palestinian suffering is always an unreliable
claim. The Court adopts the army’s position and,
in a few plain, forceful, and short sentences rejects
the petitioners’ contentions. These judgments are
important also because of what is missing. Most of
them fail to give any response to questions such
as: Who are the specific petitioners? What
damages have they suffered? What are their living
conditions? How will the judgment affect them?
The Supreme Court shows no interest in these
matters. Furthermore, for understandable reasons,
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the word “occupation” cannot be found in its
judgments. Everything is conducted as if there is
no occupation, or injustice or injury resulting from
it. In the reality that the occupation has generated,
everything is handled as if justice and judges are
non-existent.
V io l ence  by  Fo r ma l i sm :
The  Pe t i t i on  i s  P rema tu re
The  Pe t i t i on  i s  Gene ra l
The drastic methods adopted by Israel since the
beginning of the Intifada, particularly the
restrictions on freedom of movement and the high
number of gross human rights violations, as well
as the rapid pace of events create difficulties for
human rights organizations. Coupled with the lack
of resources and personnel, it is difficult for
human rights activists to obtain data and affidavits.
The element of time places organizations and
individuals wanting to petition the Supreme Court
in a problematic position: The matters require
urgent attention and delay is liable to render the
petition moot or result in rejection due to laches.
Filing a petition with great haste may also result in
denial of the petition on procedural grounds such
as failure to exhaust other remedies or premature
application to the Supreme Court, or on the
grounds that the petition is general and lacks a
sufficient factual basis. For example, in Israeli
Committee Against House Demolitions ,17 Justice
Heshin-Zamir-Beinisch ruled that:
Without discussing the merits… this petition is
premature. The Petitioners should have waited for
a reply to their letter before applying to the
Supreme Court. Prior request to the competent
authority, including giving the proper amount of
time for a response to the request, is a preliminary
condition for applying to the Court. The Petitioners
did not comply with the requirement imposed on
them; therefore, the petition should be summarily
denied. The petition is denied.
This formal procedural reasoning completely
ignores the facts underlying the petition, which
was filed on 29 March 2001. At that time, dozens
of Israeli settlers, some of them armed, had for
several days, vandalized Palestinian property in al-
Khalil and attacked Palestinians living in the city.
These acts raised the danger of a pogrom against
the Palestinian residents. The media broadcast
pictures of the events worldwide, showing Israeli
soldiers and police failing to do anything to stop
the settlers’ rioting. It was very likely that the
Israeli army would initiate military action against
the Palestinian Abu-Sneineh neighborhood, which
is located nearby the Jewish settlement in the city,
and would evacuate its residents and destroy the
neighborhood or part of it. In their petition, the
petitioners mentioned these concerns and the
circumstances that caused them to file their
petition with great haste. They also mentioned
that the Israeli army shelled the neighborhood and
requested its residents to evacuate the area. The
Court turned its back on the petitioners.
The Supreme Court’s approach enabled it to
avoid relating to important subjects and to desist
from delving into issues requiring difficult
decisions, as well as from conducting a genuine
investigation into the security considerations and
the state’s candor in raising such grounds for their
actions. In doing so, the Supreme Court approved
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practices that severely violated human rights and
refrained from placing restrictions on the army.
The Court’s approach made the petitioners’
mission impossible.
At the beginning of the current Intifada, human
rights organizations attempted to challenge the
army’s policy of placing physical, unmanned
roadblocks throughout the Occupied Territories.
These roadblocks prevented Palestinians from
moving about in their vehicles, affected the
orderly supply of food and medicine, and made it
impossible for millions of Palestinians to live
normal, routine lives. Claiming that the petitions
were general, the Supreme Court rejected the first
two petitions relating to the roadblocks. In Na’im
Salem al-‘Adreh and The Association for Civil
Rights in Israel,18 Justice Matza-Dorner-Tirkel
ruled that:
The second demand set forth in the petition
requests that we order the Respondent to remove
all the physical barriers that it placed on the roads
and thoroughfares in the area, and that it refrain
hereinafter from using the method of placing
physical barriers. This part of the petition does not
state a cause of action for the Court’s intervention.
In addition to its being general and banal, no
concrete foundation is presented that enables the
Court to examine the reasonableness and
proportionality of the measure under discussion, to
achieve the objectives for which they were
employed… As a result, therefore, the petition is
denied…
This decision ignores the factual basis that the
petitioners presented in great detail in their
petition and affidavits. The judgment transforms
the petitioners’ description of the drastic
consequences of the roadblocks into a picture of
something general and banal. In Physicians for
Human Rights,19 Justice Heshin-Zamir-Beinisch
ruled:
The Petitioner presents the Court with a general
picture laying no sufficient factual foundation on
which to base the order requested… The Court
does not consider it proper to grant the Petitioner
the relief sought, which is general relief, without
the customary and required factual foundation…
As a result of these two judgments, human rights
organizations were compelled to undertake
endless and unavailing efforts in smaller areas to
meet the requirements that the Supreme Court set.
The effect of the Supreme Court’s decisions was to
marginalize the overall picture and give major
significance to the marginal.20 The rulings of the
Supreme Court reflect a simple equation; as the
oppression increases, the generality of the petition
grows.
Expe r t s ’  D i scou rse
The Supreme Court held the legal discourse
hostage to the security discourse, and subjected it
to an “experts’ discourse” in which Palestinians are
not part of a national or political group that
opposes the occupation. The Palestinians are
severed from the overall picture and are turned
into a security issue. In this discourse, the
Palestinians are a passive entity. Israeli Jewish
experts define for the Palestinians their needs and
design the conditions under which Palestinians
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live. The experts’ discourse is ostensibly objective,
apolitical, and pure, but for them “security” is the
most important thing. The expert is always an
Israeli Jew and the Palestinians’ contentions are
always weaker.
The Supreme Court does not critically assess
these experts’ considerations or determinations in
the manner that it should examine the statements
of an interested party. The opposite is true. Even
when the Court senses that something is wrong, it
does not intervene. For example, in Zaqariyya al-
Bakri,21 the petitioners requested that the Court
order the Israeli authorities to cease present and
future construction in the Tel-Rumeida antiquities
site in al-Khalil. The Court ruled:
Ostensibly, at face value, the State’s response
regarding the reasonableness of granting building
permits on an archeological site is not persuasive.
But this is a security-political decision in which this
Court does not intervene.
The  Absu rd
The judgment in Israeli Committee Against House
Demolitions22 illustrates the hardship faced by
petitioners in the Supreme Court. The Court
describes the relief that the petitioners sought:
The Petitioners request that we order the
Respondent, the Commander of IDF forces in the
West Bank, to employ soldiers and police to
prevent settlers living in Hebron from using
violence and hooliganism against Palestinians; that
he allocate appropriate forces for this purpose; that
he refrain, himself and anyone on his behalf, from
collective punishment against the Abu-Sneineh
neighborhood in Hebron and from evacuating
residents from their homes; and, if he intends to
take military action against the Abu-Sneineh
neighborhood, that he prepare a specific plan that
will meet international standards. [emphasis
added - N.S.]
In their petition, the petitioners recognize the
legitimacy of the military’s activity in the Occupied
Territories and demand that the activity comply
with international standards. By doing so, the
petitioners refrain from challenging the
occupation. A further example of this is that the
petitioners also mention that “their objective in
filing the petition is to strengthen the Respondent
in ensuring that the settlers obey the law, to
prevent it from capitulating to rioting against
Palestinians, and require it to consider, gauge, and
slant its military response as to those who are not
at fault.” (emphasis added - N.S.)
After the Supreme Court rejected the petition
on procedural grounds, the petitioners filed
another petition.23 This second petition refers to
the settlers, in some of the instances, as “Israeli
citizens who live in Hebron,” and requests that the
Court order the military commander to require the
settlers to protect “the enclaves in which they
live.” The petitioners explain this request on the
grounds that the protective means, “can be
effective in protecting the Israeli residents, save
lives, and prevent increased violence entailed in
any attack. All this can be attained at relatively
little cost in regards to the injury to the
residents.”24
Entry into the halls of the Israeli judiciary led
the petitioners awry. It led to adoption of the rules
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